After reading this article you will learn about Feeling:- 1. Nature of Feeling 2. Theories of Feeling 3. Functions 4. Laws 5. Abnormalities.
Nature of Feeling:
Every concrete mental process has three aspects: cognition, feeling, and conation. When cognition is predominant in a mental process, we call it a cognitive state. When feeling is predominant in it, we call it an affective state or feeling. And when conation is predominant in it, we call it a conative state.
This fact must be borne in mind when we speak of cognition, feeling and conation. In order of experience there is first a cognition; it affects the subject or self which feels pleasure or pain; then the feeling gives rise to conation, activity of the subject. Thus cognition gives rise to feeling; and feeling gives rise to conation. Conation or mental activity gives rise to bodily movement.
Thus feeling is the way in which the subject is affected by a cognition. It is a passive state of the subject. It is either agreeable or disagreeable. It is either pleasure or pain. Feeling is sometimes called affection. It rises from cognition, and gives rise to a mental act or conation. I look at a flower. I have a cognition of it. It affects my mind agreeably. In other words, it gives me pleasure.
Then it produces an impulse in my mind to pluck it. Thus feeling arises from a cognition and gives rise to a conation. As contrasted with cognition and conation, feeling is subjective experience par excellence. It is an elementary mode of consciousness.
It is neither a function of cognition nor of conation. It is an original and un-derived mode of consciousness. Tetens regarded feeling as sui generis. Kant gives currency to the doctrine.
Feeling generally arises from sensations. But in feeling sensations are taken as a mass; they are not analysed or interpreted as indicators of facts. The more sensations are analysed and interpreted as sensory signs of facts, the more feeling tends to fade away.
The more the cognitive activity become prominent, the more the feeling subsides. Feeling is not an activity. But it gives rise to action. It is a motor set. It is a general attitude of the organism to maintain or change the external situation that arouses it. It is not a set or readiness of the organism for any particular act.
According to Woodworth, feeling has a sensory aspect and a motor aspect. It is a diffuse mass of un-analysed sensations which do not indicate facts. It is a general set of attitude of the organism—and not a set for a particular act. It is diffuse and massive on its sensory and motor side.
Feeling has the following characteristics. First, feelings are, compared to sensations, unstable and variable. Attend to a sensation (e.g., a blue colour) and it reaches maximum clearness. Attend to a toothache and it appears to be more intense.
But attend to the feeling of pleasure or pain, and it is likely to fade away. The moment you attend to the feeling, you withdraw your attention from the stimulus which arouse the feeling, and, therefore, the feeling disappears. Sensations can be aroused or prolonged.
But feelings cannot always be aroused or prolonged at pleasure. Secondly, feelings cannot be localized in any particular part of the body. But most organic sensations are more or less vaguely localized in the body. Thirdly, pleasure and pain can never appear at the same time.
We cannot experience pleasantness and unpleasantness simultaneously. The two kinds of feelings are mutually exclusive. Fourthly, feeling is always accompanied by some other mental process, e.g., perception, memory, imagination, emotion, and volition. It does not appear by itself. It is always an accompaniment of some other mental process.
(i) Cognition and Feeling:
Cognition informs the mind of the nature of an object. Feeling informs the mind of its own passive state. Cognition tells us the ‘whats’ of the states of consciousness, while feeling tells us the ‘hows’ of the states of consciousness. What are we conscious of? A flower or a noise. How does it affect us? The former affects us agreeably.
The latter affects us disagreeably. The former gives us pleasure. The latter gives us pain. Cognitions informs us of objects and relations external to our minds. Feelings inform us of our own mental conditions.
Feeling is simply felt; it is a passive state of mind. Sometimes it may indicate some fact. An unpleasant feeling may be simply felt, or it may be taken as the indicator of some fact. It may indicate indigestion or hunger. The more prominent is the cognitive activity, the less prominent is the feeling.
The cognitive act is analytical, while feeling is un-analytical. Feeling is not analytical. It does not inform us of our relation to the environment. It may not inform us of the conditions of our organism. It may not indicate any facts about our organism or environment.
Feeling is a simple, un-analysed, passive state. But observation and thinking are concerned with the relation of the individual to the environment while feeling is concerned with the organism. Sometimes cognition predominates and pushes feeling into the background.
Sometimes feeling predominates, and pushes feeling into the background. Sometimes feeling predominates and throws cognition into the background. Feeling generally arises from sensations. Sensations may be taken in two ways. In observation they are taken as indicators of facts, while in feeling they are taken as a mass.
But cognitions can directly revive one another, while feeling cannot directly revive feelings. The idea of an examination may revive the ideas of the examination hall, the examiners, the marks obtained, etc. But the feeling of pleasure at the sight of a mountain peak cannot directly revive the pain of climbing the peak. The pleasure car indirectly revives the pain through the idea of climbing the peak.
Hoffding points out that both cognition and feeling are subject to the law of relativity which governs all mental processes. A tall man appears taller by the side of a short man; and a short man appears shorter by the side of a tall man.
Thus the law of relativity governs cognitions. Likewise, pain appearing after pleasure is felt more keenly on account of the contrast; pleasure arising from the satisfaction of hunger is felt keenly if the pain of hunger is excessive. Thus both cognition and feeling are subject to the law of relativity.
(ii) Sensation and Feeling:
Sensation is a simple cognition produced by an external stimulus in the mind. It is objective as it depends upon the external stimulus. Feeling is subjective as it depends upon the mind. It is the way in which the subject is affected.
The same stimulus sometimes gives rise to a sensation and feeling. It produces a sensation; the sensation affects the subject in a certain way, which feels either pleasure or pain. The stimulus produces a sensation, and the sensation produces a feeling.
The same stimulus produces the same sensation; but the same sensation does not affect the subject in the same way; it may sometimes affect the subject agreeably, and sometimes disagreeably. For example, the sensation of sweetness produced by tasting sugar is at one time felt as agreeable, at another time as disagreeable.
Thus sensation and feeling are different from each other. But feeling arises from sensations which are taken as mass. In feeling, sensations are neither analysed nor taken as indicators of facts.
Titchener regards feeling as an attribute of sensation. You see a red rose, and have a sensation of red colour. It has an attribute of pleasure. You hear a noise and have a sensation of sound. It has an attribute of pain. Thus pleasure or pain is an attribute, feeling tone or hedonic tone, of a sensation.
But this view is wrong. The sensation of red colour produces the feeling of pleasure. The sensation of noise produces the feeling of pain. A sensation does not feel pleasure or pain. But the subject or mind feels pleasure or pain.
Feeling or affection is an elementary mental state. It is not reducible to a sensation or its attribute. Further, feeling itself has attributes, viz., quality, intensity, and duration. So it cannot be regarded as an attribute of sensation.
Feeling or affection agrees with sensation in possessing quality, intensity, and duration. But it has no extensity like sensations. Sensations can be localized. But feelings cannot be localized.
(iii) Feeling and Conation or Mental Activity:
A cognition (e.g., perception of a flower) affects the mind and produces a feeling in it (e.g., pleasure). The feeling gives rise to a conation or mental activity. Thus feeling is the link between cognition and conation. A cognition is the cause of feeling; and feeling is the cause of conation. Ward holds this view.
Again, a conation or mental activity tends towards an end. When the end of conation is fulfilled, there is pleasure, and when the end of conation is baffled, there is paint. The more easily a mental activity passes to its end-state, the more it gives rise to pleasure.
The more a mental activity is obstructed, the more it gives rise to pain. Thus, conation also is a cause of feeling. Further, conation gives rise to pleasure; thwarted conation gives rise to pain. Ward and McDougall hold this view.
Attention is a kind of conation or mental act. It also is a cause of feeling. Effective attention to an object or an idea gives rise to pleasure. Ineffective attention to an object or an idea gives rise to pain. Conation in the form of attention is a cause of feeling. Thus the dependence of feeling an conation is mutual. Ward and Stout hold this view.
Bentham, J.S. Mill and Bain hold that feeling determines conation or activity. Pleasure and pain are the springs of action. We strive to get pleasure or to avoid pain. This doctrine is called psychological hedonism.
McDougall, on the other hand, holds that conation (striving, attention, desire, activity of any kind) is determined by cognition, and that pleasure and pain are the effects of conation. Conation attains its goal, pleasure arises, and when it is thwarted or frustrated, pain arises. This view is right.
(iv) Feeling and Desire:
The more an action for the fulfilment of a desire goes on without any obstruction, the more pleasant it is; the more action for the realization of the desired end is obstructed, the more unpleasant it is. If desire is fulfilled, it gives rise to pleasure.
If desire is frustrated, it gives rise to pain. Desire is directed towards an object. If the object is attained, it gives rise to pleasure. If the object is no attained, it gives rise to pain. Thus desire is a cause of feeling or pleasure—pain.
Feeling also is a cause of desire. Generally, a painful feeling of want is a spring of action. Pain gives rise to a desire to relieve it. The pain of hunger produces a desire to seek and eat food. Pleasure is not generally a spring of action. Thus desire depends upon feeling.
Desire itself is partly pleasant and mainly painful. It not only often springs from pain, but it is also itself very unpleasant, because it contains an intense consciousness of the differences between the actual and the ideal.
In the desire for food there is a keen consciousness of the difference between the present state of hunger and the future state of satisfaction; and this consciousness is intensely unpleasant, though it is not devoid of a tinge of pleasure arising from the anticipation of future satisfaction. Thus desire is coloured by an affective tone.
(v) Feeling and Overt Action:
Feeling is a passive state of the organism, and not an overt activity. It does not deal with external objects as an overt act does. Feeling is an internal state of the organism, which does not produce external results. Yet feeling gives rise to overt action which either preserves or changes the external situation.
Pleasant feeling leads to accepting, preserving, or furthering the situation that arouses it. Unpleasant feeling leads to rejecting, avoiding, or changing the situation that arouses it. Feeling, therefore, is the cause of action, though in itself it is not action. There can be feeling without any definite overt action to maintain or change the situation. There can likewise be overt action without a minimum of feeling.
Hence feeling and overt action are different from each other. But feeling may be regarded as a motor set. It is the general set of the organism. Pleasure is the general set for preserving or furthering the situation. Pain is the general set for getting rid of the situation. In feeling there is no special set for any particular act.
(vi) Mixed Feelings:
Some psychologists hold that pleasure and pain are antagonistic to each other, and that therefore they cannot coexist together because they neutralize each other. So the subject feels either pleasure or pain at the same time.
But McDougall and Stout hold that there are mixed feelings of pleasure and pain which blend with each other. Many emotions are attended with mixed feelings. Active sympathy for the misery of another person is attended with pleasure and pain.
Bridges avers that we do experience mixed feelings sometimes, and that whether they arise simultaneously or follow each other in quick succession is an academic question. The same person, the same food, or some other object, arouses pleasure and pain sometimes. Some psychologists hold that they exist simultaneously. Others hold that they arise in rapid succession.
Pain-Sensation and Pain-Feeling:
There is a difference between pain-sensation and pain-feeling. The tactual sensation of pain can be localized and combined with other sensations. Organic pain-sensations are not always more or less definitely localized. Tactual and organic pains are sensations; they may be often be distinguished as shooting, burning, gnawing, etc.
Thus they may have different qualities. They cannot be identified with the purely subjective feelings of pain which have no objective qualities. Moreover, pain-sensations may sometimes be agreeable. Some persons feel pleasure in touching a loose tooth with the tongue. They experience a feeling of pleasure and a sensation of pain at the same time. Therefore, the feeling of pain is different from the sensation of pain.
Theories of Feeling:
(a) Psychological Theories of Feeling:
Herbart holds that there are ideas or idea-forces in the mind, which are the ultimate elements of consciousness. Pleasure arises out of the harmony of ideas, and pain out of the tension or conflict of ideas. Feeling is a function of ideas. It is not an original and elementary mode of consciousness. Herbart is an intellectualist and reduces feeling to a function of ideas.
But a single sensation unconnected with other sensations can be itself produce a feeling of pleasure or pain. The sensation of sweet produces pleasure, and the sensation of bitter produces pain. We may combine sensations in various ways. But they can never give us anything but sensations.
Sensation and feeling can exist independently of each other. They can be artificially separated from each-other. Sensation and feeling obey their own laws.
When the intensity of a sensation increases or diminishes, feeling also does so; but only up to a certain point, for a moment arrives when it changes its quality (Wundt’s law of stimulation). Pleasure arises from a harmony of ideas; pain arises from a conflict of ideas. But pleasure and pain are subjective feelings, and not reducible to ideas.
Stout holds that feeling is a function of conation or mental activity. Pleasure arises from the fulfilment of mental activity. Pain arises from the non-fulfilment of mental activity. The normal condition of mind is a stable equilibrium. When the equilibrium is destroyed, pain arises; and when the equilibrium is restored, pleasure arises.
Stout says, “Whatever conditions further and favour conation in the attainment of its end, yield pleasure. Whatever conditions obstruct conation in the attainment of its end, are sources of displeasure”.
Ward holds that effective accommodation of attention to an object gives pleasure, and that ineffective accommodation of attention to an object gives pain. Ward says, “There is pleasure in proportion as a maximum of attention is effectively exercised, and pain in proportion as such effective attention is frustrated by restraints, shocks, or incomplete and faulty adaptations.
Some ideal or mental pleasures and pains can be accounted for in this way. But physical pleasures and pains cannot be explained by these psychological theories. The correct theory of pleasure and pain must take into account not only the condition of the mind but also that of the body.
(b) Physiological Theories of Feeling:
(i) Aristotle holds that there is a constant amount of energy in the organism which is neither increased nor decreased. Pleasure arises from the normal function or moderate use of the energy; pain arises from the under functioning or over-functioning of this energy.
This theory ignores the end or purpose for which the vital energy is exercised. The over-use of energy for one purpose (e.g., attending a sick friend) may be pleasurable whereas a moderate use of it (e.g., attending a sick enemy) may be painful. Moreover, it does not take into account the attainment or nonattainment of the end in view.
The same amount of energy may be exercised. But if its purpose is fulfilled, it gives pleasure; and if its purpose is not fulfilled, it gives pain. Stout says, “We are pleased when we hit a nail on the head, and displeased when we miss it”. Thus the end or purpose and its fulfilment or non-fulfilment are to be taken into account. Mere exercise of vital energy, moderate, or immoderate cannot adequately account for pleasure and pain.
(ii) Spinoza, Kant, Bain and Herbert Spencer hold that pleasure is an index of increase of life, and that pain is an index of decrease of life. Pleasure is a psychical correlate of increase of vitality; pain is a psychical correlate of decrease of vitality. Pleasure is vitalizing or life-giving; pain is devitalizing or life-destroying. Kant says, “Pleasure is the feeling of the furtherance, pain of the hindrance of life.”
Herbert Spencer tries to establish this view by appealing to facts of biological evolution. Every creature seeks pleasure and avoids pain. If pleasures were devitalizing and pain were vitalizing, creatures would be extinct long ago. But creatures continue to live, and naturally seek pleasure and avoid pain. This clearly proves that pleasure furthers life and that pain hinders life.
Bain attempts to prove this doctrine by appealing to direct experience. Joy stimulates all vital functions, such as circulation, digestion and respiration. Sorrow, on the other hand, has a depressing effect on their functions. Pleasure is manifested in the brightness of the eyes, the flushing of the face, etc. Pain is manifested in paleness of the eyes and the face.
All pleasures are not vitalizing. Some fatal poisons are pleasant to the taste. All pains are not devitalizing. Quinine and some other .medicines have disagreeable taste. Certain fatal diseases (e.g., consumption) are not proportionately painful.
Certain organic disturbances (e.g., toothache) are extremely painful but they are not importunately devitalizing. Only physical pleasures and pains can be accounted for by this physiological theory. Purely mental pleasures cannot be explained by this theory.
There is a confusion in Spencer whether pleasure and pain are merely correlates or by products of vital activity or initiating causes of vital activity. The difference is important. If pleasure and pain be regarded as mere by-products of vital activity, they can have no causal influence upon the mind.
But the influence of feeling upon thought and action is a most potent fact in our experience”. Hence pleasure—pain cannot be regarded as a mere function of vital activity. Nor is it a function of intellect or conation. Feeling must be an original independent function of the mind which has an intimate connection with cognition, and conation, on the one hand, and with vital activity, on the other.
(iii) Some psychologists hold that facilitation of neural process gives rise to pleasure, and the inhibition of neural process gives rise to un-pleasure. When the discharge of the nerve current is easy, pleasure arises; when it is obstructed or blocked, un-pleasure arises.
Thorndike holds this view and uses the terms “satisfaction” and “annoyance” instead of pleasure and un-pleasure. The exact, nature of neural facilitation or inhibition has not been determined.
Elementary Forms of Feeling:
Feeling or affection, as a passive and subjective state of the subject, is either agreeable or disagreeable, pleasant or unpleasant. Pleasantness and unpleasantness are the elementary form of feeling. Pleasure and pain are two kinds of feeling, Some psychologists hold that there is another kind of feeling, e.g., natural feeling or feeling of indifference. This is not admitted by others.
(c) Wundt’s Tri dimensional Theory and Royce’s tri dimensional Theory of Feeling:
Royce holds that there are two dimensions of feeling, viz., pleasantness—unpleasantness and excitement—calm. This is called the bi-emensional theory of feeling.
Wundt holds that there are three dimensions of feeling, viz., pleasantness—unpleasantness, excitement—calm and tension—relaxation. This is called the tri dimensional theory of feeling. The individual members of these groups may be combined in various ways. Thus pleasantness may be accompanied by tension and excitement, or by excitement alone, or by calm alone. Both these views are wrong.
(1) There is difference between excitement and calm. But these are different kinds of organic and muscular sensations. When we are excited, our muscles becomes tense, our respiration becomes quick, etc. When we are calm, the muscles become inactive and the organs function in harmony, and we are conscious only of the flow of mental processes.
Thus excitement and calm are of the nature of sensations. They give rise to pleasure or pain. So they should not be regarded as feelings.
(2) Similarly, there is a difference between tension and relaxation. But these also are of the nature of muscular sensations. They are due to the kinaesthetic sensations which accompany such states and report the tension of the muscular system.
Strain and relaxation are sometimes general characteristics of the total attitude of consciousness towards its object. But they are cognitive in nature. Hence they cannot be regarded as kinds of feeling. So pleasure and pain alone are the two kinds of feeling.
(3) Wundt and Royce wrongly include conative experience in feeling. But conation is an irreducible mental mode.
Is Pleasure Negative?
According to Plato and Schopenhauer, pain is a positive feeling and pleasure is a negation of pain. Pleasure is a negative feeling, and consists in the absence of pain. Schopenhauer bases his argument on the law of relativity.
Life is activity; it is striving after an end; it is an effort to remove a painful feeling of want. When the want is removed, pleasure ensues. Thus pleasure is not a real and positive feeling. It is a negative feeling of the removal of pain.
This view is wrong. Pleasure following the removal of pain is heightened by it because of contrast. But it is no less real and positive than pain which precedes it. Pleasure is as real and positive as pain. It is felt as a positive feeling. Very often pleasure is preceded by pain. Normal and healthy functions of life are attended by pleasure.
Esthetic pleasures are not preceded by pain. So pleasure is as positive as pain. The law of relativity only shows that pleasure is heightened by contrast with pain, and that pain is heightened by contrast with pleasure. But it does not prove that pleasure is a negative feeling.
Is there any Neutral Feeling?
Feeling is either agreeable or disagreeable. Pleasure and pain are the only feelings. There is no neutral feeling or feeling of indifference. The so-called neutral states are cognitions; they are not affections or feelings. Stout rightly holds that if we consider our total consciousness at any moment, we shall always find in it an element of feeling—pleasure or pain.
Thus the so-called neutral states considered with the background of total consciousness are not devoid of feeling. Pillsbury says that a stimulus may be indifferent, but that a feeling cannot be indifferent. An indifferent stimulus does not give rise to feeling. Pure feeling or affection must be either pleasant or unpleasant.
Function of Feeling:
Feelings are our original experiences. Many experiences are accompanied by pleasantness and unpleasantness, which are the original equipment of the human mind. Generally, pleasant experiences are beneficial for the organism, and unpleasant experiences are harmful. But there are exceptions. Our native tendencies to feel pleasure and un-pleasure are modified by experience.
Some things originally unpleasant we come to like; other things originally pleasant we learn to dislike. But generally the pleasant reactions are biologically serviceable. The situation that arouses pleasure we want to preserve and further. The situation that arouses pain we want to avoid, or escape.
Pleasantness is linked up with positive bodily adjustment. Unpleasantness is linked up with negative bodily adjustment. They play an important part in habit formation beneficial or injurious to the organism.
Affective Adaptation:
A pleasant situation (e.g., a beautiful garden of flowers) may cease to arouse pleasure because of repetition of experience or because of a different disposition of the subject. An unpleasant situation of (e.g., the dressing of a deep and extensive wound) may cease to evoke pain at least in great intensity because of repetition of experience.
This process is called affective adaptation. Sometimes an originally pleasant situation arouses un-pleasure later in the course of experience. Going to school might evoke pleasure in a child because of the company of the other children.
But later it may evoke in him un-pleasure because of the teacher’s punishment and the teasing of some children. Likewise, going to school might evoke un-pleasure in the beginning because of the fear of punishment. But later it may evoke pleasure because of his success in learning his lessons, the teacher’s approbation and praise, and the other children’s good behaviour. Thus feelings are acquired and modified.
Laws of Feeling:
(a) The Law of Stimulation:
The moderate stimulation of a sense-organ by a stimulus produces pleasure, but too little or too much stimulation of produces pain. A dazzling light and a very faint light are painful. But a moderately bright light is pleasant.
Similarly, sound and a very faint sound are painful. But a moderately loud sound is pleasant. Over-functioning of an organ is painful. But a moderate exercise of it is pleasant. This is Aristotle’s view. Moderate exercise of vitality is pleasant. Too much or too little exercise of it is painful.
But not only the quantity, but also the quality of the stimulus produces pleasure or pain. Sweet taste in all degrees is pleasant; but bitter taste in all degrees is painful.
(b) The Law of Change:
A change of stimulation is pleasant, while an unchanging stimulation is painful. Even a sweet song becomes painful, if it is continued and repeated for a long time. Monotony is unpleasant. Change in stimulation is pleasant. Sour taste after sweet taste is agreeable. The exercise of different muscles in succession is agreeable. But the repeated exercise of the same muscle is disagreeable. Variety is the mother of enjoyment.
This law has some exceptions. First, gradual Change is agreeable, but too rapid change is disagreeable. Too rapid change in the cinema pictures to which the eyes cannot easily be accommodated is painful. But gradual change in them is pleasant.
Then, pleasure after pain is more keenly felt. Pain after pleasure also becomes more intense. Contrast heightens the intensity of feeling. Lastly, even a painful activity repeated very often regularly becomes habitual and agreeable. A blacksmith’s continued exercise of the muscles of his hands becomes agreeable through practice.
(c) The Law of Harmony and Discord:
Harmonious stimulation of an organ is agreeable; discordant stimulation of it is disagreeable. Musical sounds or tones harmoniously stimulate the auditory organ, and so produce pleasure. But noises discordantly stimulate it, and so produce pain. Harmonious and rhythmic movements of the limbs in dancing produce pleasure. But jerky and irregular movements of them produce pain.
Abnormalities of Feeling:
(i) Excess of Feeling:
Pleasure or un-pleasure may be very much increased in intensity. In a joyful mood all objects excite pleasure. Pleasure is aroused by many objects in a mild state of drunkenness and in manic excitement. In a mood of depression, fatigue, physical illness, and melancholy all objects tend to arouse un-pleasure.
(ii) Decrease of Feeling:
In fatigue, physical illness, worry and the like, pleasant situations fail to arouse pleasure or arouse faint pleasure. In early stages of dementia praecox pleasure is not excited by pleasant situations. This state is called “apathy” or feeling less ness. Similarly, unpleasant situations fail, in the aforesaid conditions, to evoke un-pleasure or evoke faint un-pleasure.
Even in a normal person who has sedulously cultivated equanimity and tranquillity pleasant situations fail to evoke pleasure, and unpleasant situations fail to evoke un-pleasure.” In senility also feeble pleasure or un-pleasure is aroused by the pleasant and the unpleasant situations.
In senile decay first the aesthetic and intellectual feelings fade out. Then the altruistic feelings disappear. At last the egoistic feelings fade Gut.
(iii) Perversion of Feeling:
In physical or mental fatigue, or emotional strain, a normal person may feel pleasure in an unpleasant situation, or feel un-pleasure in a pleasant situation. In mental derangements (e.g., dementia praecox a patient may feel pleasure in a said situation, or feel un-pleasure in a pleasant situation). The perversion of feelings, in mental derangements is due to dissociation between the feelings and the ideas.